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I would like to thank the many respondents who have, in three separate rounds, 
reflected on my paper and taken its materialist lines of enquiry into new and 
sometimes unexpected directions. The extraordinary range of the contributions 
bringing to bear insights from fields as diverse as comparative literature, literary 
translation, translation technology, book history, ecocriticism, autoethnography, and 
object-oriented philosophy is testament to the sheer interdisciplinarity in which 
translation studies thrives. In writing my Position Paper, the aim had been to provoke 
a renewed discussion of the materiality of cultural or human operations, which is long 
overdue, especially when we think we understand what this means. I am grateful that 
my respondents agree as to the necessity of this debate, although as will become 
apparent, I disagree with some of the tenets they seem to hold. 
 
“Translation and the Materialities of Communication” put forward two 
potentially contentious points: (1) that media technologies repeatedly organize our 
cognitive and perceptual modalities; (2) that material objects such as books or 
computers shape practices of translation. The former point is derived from media 
theorists influenced by McLuhan; the latter is an extension of the argument put 
forward by historians of the book. Since I sense discontent with these arguments 
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among several of the responses, I would like to use my response to explain the 
rationale for the thesis in more detail. Historians of the book have shown that 
practices of reading and writing have varied historically in accordance with the 
material forms available for the storage and retrieval of information. If we accept that 
“Transformations of the book and transformations of reading practices necessarily go 
hand in hand” (Cavallo and Chartier 1999, 15), then why should this not also be the 
case for translation? After all, translating partakes in both reading and writing, and 
leaves us with a material record in the form of the translation itself. But here we must 
not confuse empirical evidence with material evidence. True, it is difficult to assess 
reading practices in the pre-modern period, or indeed in any period given the scarcity 
of empirical evidence left by real readers. Yet, the history of reading has shown that 
significant quantitative and qualitative shifts in reading practices have occurred with 
the shift from codex to print to hypermedia. Given that translation leaves real traces 
and marks on the page, I don’t see how assessing transformations of translation 
practices in relation to transformations of the book (codex, print, digital) is any more 
of a “speculative exercise”, to address Guyda Armstrong’s concern, than assessing 
transformations of practices of reading. If anything, it makes the historian’s life easier 
to have at hand the material record of the empirical base in the form of a written-
down translation.  
 
But the disagreement is perhaps more fundamental than this. “Where we 
diverge” Armstrong writes, “is in our approach to and understanding of the 
relationship between historic media technologies and their supposed ‘effects’ on 
translation (simply put, the question of whether they shape or are shaped by their 
contemporary textual practices – or both).” My argument follows a key point made by 
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print historian Donald McKenzie, namely that “forms effect meaning” (1999, 13). He 
goes on to address “the complex relation of medium to meaning” in the context of the 
medieval codex and reiterates the point by stating that there appears to be an emergent 
consensus in medieval studies that “forms effect sense” (ibid., 18), a recognizably 
McLuhanite point.1 As Anne Coldiron rightly points out McKenzie’s work proved 
crucial in collapsing the “old division” between “the supposedly immaterial work and 
the supposedly incidental material text that conveys it”. McKenzie’s work also of 
course pushes the boundaries in making a case, very much ahead of his time, for 
studying the book and the verbal arts alongside “visual, oral, and numeric data” in the 
form of non-book materialities of communication, such as maps, music, recorded 
sound, films, video, and computer-stored information (ibid., 13). This broadening of 
the remit of book studies sits well with my proposal for comparative media. And yet, 
given his extraordinary foresightedness as regards the explosion of material media, I 
wonder whether the implications of McKenzie’s materialism have been fully grasped, 
including by McKenzie himself.  
 
Editors McDonald and Suarez gloss the importance of McKenzie’s works in 
these terms: “he gave fullest expression to the idea that the forms of texts affect their 
meaning” (2002, 9). Similarly, Chartier cites his phrase “forms effect meaning” 
(1997, 82) as a key tenet of book history, reiterating the point two pages later in his 
own words as “forms affect meaning” (84). Since Chartier’s essay is based on a 
translation by Lydia Cochrane of his “Préface” to the French translation by Marc 
Amfreville of McKenzie’s La bibliographie et la sociologie des textes (1991), it is 
instructive to re-examine the French. While Chartier’s “Préface” leaves the McKenzie 
quote in English (7) – as if the phrase were untranslatable (in a Derridean sense) – the 
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rephrasing appears as “les formes affectent le sens” (10-11). In turn, Amfreville 
translates the phrases from McKenzie as follows: “les formes ont un effect sur le 
sens” (30; 38), thus watering down the overtly determinist stance by McKenzie. In 
contrast to the French, the Spanish version of Chartier’s Preface, now entitled “Un 
humanista entre dos mundos: Don McKenzie” (2005) omits the direct quote from 
McKenzie altogether (8) and gives Chartier’s gloss as “las formas de los textos 
afectan a su sentido” (12). The translator Frenando Bouza renders McKenzie’s “forms 
effect meaning” as “las formas repercuten en el significado” (30), and “forms effect 
sense” as “las formas crean sentido” (35).  
 
The reason I am quoting citations and translations of what Chartier 
acknowledges to be one of the most “powerful” ideas in McKenzie’s book – here, that 
“forms shape meaning” (Chartier 1997, 82) – has to with the inconsistency in the way 
in which this idea circulates: “effect” (to cause) slides all to easily into “affect” (to 
alter or influence). While The Book History Reader misprints “effect” as “affect” 
(Finkelstein and McCleery 2002, 29, 31), the editors of The Renaissance Computer 
imply that there is a misspelling in McKenzie’s original when they quote the line as 
“Forms effect [sic] meanings” (Rhodes and Sawday 2000, 9).2 Whether typographical 
error, spelling mistake, translation decision, or interpretive strategy, one thing is clear, 
effect and affect are not at all the same thing,3 and therein lies a fundamental 
confusion and clearly an unwillingness to explore the implications of technological 
determinism.  
 
Further, by citing McLuhan approvingly, McKenzie (1999, 17) makes himself 
vulnerable to the charge of determinism by association. His insistence – on the one 
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hand that material forms effect meaning or sense, which in effect gives objects 
agency, and on the other that we should not lose sight of “human agency” (15) 
because counter to the “anti-humanism” practiced by much of theory, bibliography 
can “correct that tendency” and “show the human presence in any recorded text” (29) 
– brings to the fore two radically incommensurable positions. One is object-oriented, 
the other is subject- or human-centred. This is a dividing line that characterizes many 
of the responses to my paper.  
 
Song Hou and Xuanmin Luo, for instance, highlight the importance of 
Latour’s theory that allows for the agency of objects, and Allison Burkette in drawing 
on archaeology makes it clear that objects are not necessarily passive things but 
“enactive partners in the creation of meaning”. Working in the field of computer-
aided translation and machine translation, Minako O’Hagan is well aware of the 
impact of technology and non-human agents on translation and quite rightly presses 
for “theorization” to catch up with the “reality of modern translation”. Rebecca 
Kosick’s response offers precisely such a theorization by framing these issues in 
relation to speculative realism, a philosophy that critiques the way in which human-
centrist discourses regard even objects that precede humanity (Meillassoux’s “arche-
fossil” springs to mind here: 2008, 1-27) exclusively in terms of how these objects 
relate to us or what they tell us about ourselves, as Narcissus to a mirror. Evident here 
is an emphasis on the constitutive role that objects and machines play in translation.  
 
Other respondents emphasize that objects, technologies, and media are 
“human-created” and the “results of human imagination and labor”, that is, that they 
are “not haphazard or incidental but rather are conceived, planned, executed and 
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signifying inside cultural matrices” (Coldiron); or, as Norbert Bachleitner does, that 
“media do not develop and work by themselves in a mystical way; they are invented, 
developed, adapted and eventually exchanged for other tools by human beings to 
serve certain purposes”. Contrastively, when Susan Bassnett points out that I don’t 
see technology as “dehumanizing” but regard it as a “mediation of basic laws of 
nature”, she hits the nail on the head: technology, and indeed nature, are not passively 
there to serve as man’s workshop or “inorganic body”. There is no distinguishing the 
soil in which we grow stuff from the paper on which we draw. Rather, what is at issue 
is a non-reversible hierarchy: without nature to produce us, there can be neither 
technology, culture, nor politics, whereas without technology, culture and politics 
there still can be nature. My quibble then is with the over-inflation of the role and rule 
of humans in nature: yes, we make technologies, but a technology that acts counter to 
the laws of nature is impossible. As Durham Peters, making a case as to why “a 
philosophy of media needs a philosophy of nature” (2016, 1), puts it: “The agency of 
human beings is a question we should answer, but not a fact we should assume” (89). 
And in so doing, we should neither “underestimate[] the power of devices” nor 
“overestimate[] the power of people” (88).  
 
What is objected to, but not stated directly except by Michael Cronin, is the 
issue of technological determinism4 – a “political fatalism” which Cronin urges us to 
resist. So, let me make the point crystal clear by way of McLuhan and Raymond 
Williams, whose debate also brings into focus the repeated watering down of 
McKenzie’s claim that material media effect, i.e. determine, meaning and sense. The 
ideological stance taken by Williams, and subsequently adopted within cultural 
studies, rejects the idea that technology could be an agent of cultural change, and 
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stresses instead how it is certain cultural conditions that make possible technological 
change. This is how Williams puts the issue: “If the medium – whether print or 
television – is the cause, all other causes, all that men ordinarily see as history, are at 
once reduced to effects” (1974, 127). For Williams it is not technology that has 
determining effects, as if it stood outside a given cultural and historical context, but 
rather, technology is itself an effect determined by socio-historical, i.e., finally human 
causes. By contrast, I think that we would be mistaken to assume that culture solely 
depends on how humans make use of technology. Inherent in Williams’s argument is 
a humanism that increasingly sits ill with technological development, which neither 
has foreseen uses (as William also concedes) nor has intentions, but does, I contend, 
induce effects that are not in our control. Williams’ assumption therefore that we 
make use of technology or interact with it, or even that as humans we are solely 
responsible for having invented it, betrays too narrow a conception of its effects. 
Technology is environmental. This is why I wrote that humanity cannot sequester 
itself from the ecology, as “natural” as it is technological, nor stand apart from, or 
without it, as if controlling it was simply a matter of pulling a plug. Thus, where 
Williams pitches technology against human agency, culture against materialism and 
physiology, I have been gesturing towards another kind of argument altogether: since 
no human culture is possible without an enabling materiality and a possibilizing 
technology, culture and technology are not mutually exclusive, but on the contrary 
necessarily inclusive. And if this is so then technologies produce consequent 
imaginations: they are active in effecting the ways in which we think, read, write, and 
translate. 
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Notes 
 
                                                
1 Compare McLuhan’s point that “the medium is the message” (1964, 15-30). 
2 Rodes and Sawday reference, as do Finkelstein and McCleery, the British Library 
edition of McKenzie’s The Panizzi Lectures 1985. Bibliography and the Sociology 
of Texts (1986). The salient passages are the same as in the Cambridge University 
edition I cite. 
3 On the substantial difference between the use of these two terms in McKenzie and 
Chartier, see Littau (2006, 26, 159-160); on “subtly” changing the meaning of 
“effect” to “affect”, see Gayley (2010, 113-14); on the ease by which effect/affect are 
misspelt in English, see Van Mierlo (2013, 142). 
4 The most sophisticated argument I have come across as to the differences between 
McLuhan and Williams is offered by Iain Hamilton Grant (2003) in developing an 
account of technological determinism that is quite different to that which Williams 
ascribes to McLuhan: deploying not the logic a mechanical causality but of non-linear 
causality. 
 
 
 
 
 
